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RECENT DECISIONS
PLEADING AND PRACTIcE-SEcTION 5 2 -A OF THE VEHICLE AND
TRAFFIC LAW CoNsTRUED.-Defendant, a resident of New York
State, had been absent therefrom for more than thirty days attending
college in another state. The question is whether at the time he was
served the defendant had removed from the state within the meaning
of Section 52-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law,1 which provides for
constructive service on operators and motor vehicles on a public
highway who shall have removed from the state prior to the com-
mencement of an action against them growing out of any accident
in which they might have been then involved and who shall have
been absent for more than thirty days continuously therefrom. On
appeal from an order vacating the summons and complaint, held, for
the defendant. The word "remove", as construed, indicates a legis-
lative intention to require more than a temporary absence and hence
the constructive service is ineffectual, Marano v. Finn., 155 Misc.
793, 281 N. Y. Supp. 440 (App. T. 1st Dept. 1935).
The section under discussion is a remedial one, facilitating the
enforcement of civil remedies by those injured in person or prop-
erty by the negligent operation of motor vehicles on the public high-
way.2 No difficulty is encountered in construing the section as ap-
plicable to residents who leave the state with an intent to establish
a domicile elsewhere. 3 In the instant case, the court argues that the
use of the word "removed" and of the language in the title and text
of the section indicates a legislative intention to confine the statutory
remedy to the above situation and none other. However, we note
that "removed" is used in conjunction with the word "absent" and
the court could have stressed the latter word rather than the former
one as the determining factor in permitting constructive service so
as to save the injured party's remedy. Physical absence and non-
residence are not merely varying forms of the same concept.4 Al-
though the literal and technical meaning of the language used in the
title and text of the section might seem to imply otherwise,5 still in
1 N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (1931) 'c. 71.
'Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927); Continental
Casualty Co. v. Nelson, 147 Misc. 821, 264 N. Y. Supp. 560 (1933).
'Kurland v. Chernobil, 260 N. Y. 254, 183 N. E. 380 (1932).
"Mack v. Mendels, 249 N. Y. 350, 164 N. E. 248 (1928). In Universal
Credit Co. v. Knights, 145 Misc. 876, 261 N. Y. Supp. 252 (1932), it was held
that removal of a temporary character was not the removal contemplated by
N. Y. Personal Property Law, Section 74, and the elaborate machinery set up
for refiling was intended for a permanent and continuous change rather than
one of a transitory, temporary character. We note, however, that the section
was strictly construed in favor of the conditional seller since it deprived him
of his common-law rights.
'Kurland v. Chernobil, 260 N. Y. 254, 183 N. E. 380 (1932) ; cf. Rawstorne
v. Maguire, 265 N. Y. 204, 192 N. E. 294 (1934) (the test of residence was
held to be domicile in connection with an order for substituted service of
summons under Section 230 of the Civil Practice Act) ; Mack v. Mendels, 249
N. Y. 350, 164 N. E. 248 (1928) (it was held that non-residence does not
constitute absence within the meaning of Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act).
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view of the remedial nature of the legislation, designed to afford
greater protection to the personal safety of the travelers and to pro-
mote the public safety, and the apparent objectives sought to be
attained, it is submitted that the term "non-residents" should be held
to express the connection between person and place 6 and not as a
synonym for domicile 7 and that the strict, literal interpretation of
the statute be not adopted." This decision limits the practical effec-
tiveness of the section as an aid to the encouragement of greater
care in the operation of motor vehicles and to the protection of the
rights of injured persons.
A. S.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-SERVICE OF PROCESS-IMMUNITY OF
NON-RESIDENT AT APPELLATE HEARING.-Plaintiff, a resident of
Connecticut, accompanied her counsel to the Appellate Division to
hear the argument of her case. While returning home, she was
served with a summons in a foreclosure suit. On appeal from an
order denying a motion to set aside the service, held, order reversed,
motion to set aside granted. Plaintiff is privileged from service of
process while attending the argument of an appeal. ..Chase National
Bank v. Turner, 269 N. Y. 397, 199 N. E. 636 (1936).
A non-resident coming to this state solely to appear as a party
or witness in a judicial proceeding is immune from service of civil
process during the proceeding and for a reasonable time thereafter.1
This immunity is a common law privilege and is intended to en-
courage voluntary appearance of non-residents and to secure the
expedient administration of justice.2 Non-residents who are here by
compulsion of law are not so privileged.3 Nor are persons who come
here for the dual purpose of attending the proceeding and discharg-
'Cincinnati H. & D. R. Co. v. Ives, 3 N. Y. Supp. 895 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
"The courts have invariably distinguished residence from domicile par-
ticularly in connection with the construction of various statutory provisions."
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Barrett, 142 Misc. 192, 196, 254 N. Y.
Supp. 166, 170 (1931).
'Surace v. Danna, 248 N. Y. 18, 161 N. E. 315 (1928) ; Glennie v. Falls
Equipment Co., 238 App. Div. 7, 11, 263 N. Y. Supp. 124, 129 (4th Dept. 1933).
'2 CARMODY, N. Y. PRACTIcE (1930) § 648.
Person v. Grier, 66 N. Y. 124 (1876); Mathews v. Tuffts, 87 N. Y. 568
(1882); Parker v. Marco, 136 N. Y. 585, 32 N. E. 989 (1893); Netrograph
Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham, 197 N. Y. 377, 90 N. E. 962 (1910).
'Williams v. Bacon, 10 Wend. 636 (N. Y. 1834); Slade v. Josephs, 5 Daly
187 (N. Y. 1870); Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N. Y. 110 (1874); People ex rel.
Post v. Cross, 135 N. Y. 536, 32 N. E. 246 (1892); Netrograph Mfg. Co. v.
Scrugham, 197 N.-Y. 377, 90 N. E. 962 (1910).
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